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INTRODUCTION
Over the preceding 40 years, the Internet has
grown to a network that connects an estimated
1.8 billion users that now has reached a penetra-
tion rate of almost 25 percent globally. What
was once a tool known and used by only a small
number of high-profile researchers has, within
one generation, become a universal commodity,
like electricity, in the daily lives of hundreds of
millions of users within one generation. Such an
unmatched phenomenon rightly justifies the
paramount importance appended to the ongoing
discussion on the “future Internet.” Academia
and researchers around the globe now attempt
to envision the definition, the design, and the
construction of the future Internet and its imper-
atives. On the research side, for instance, among
the different initiatives undertaken on the sub-
ject of “future Internet” worldwide, reference
could be made to the U.S.-based Global Envi-
ronment for Network Innovation (GENI) initia-
tive [1] and the European Union Future Internet
Research and Experimentation (FIRE) initiative
[2]. The United Nations World Summits on
Information Society, held in 2007 and 2009,
while addressing the theme of the Internet, fur-
ther augmented its scope as the main component
of the Information Society of the future and for-
mally introduced cultural aspects into it as well.
This flurry of interest in the future of the Inter-
net is also a source of confusion; different and
competitive requirements as well as architectural
concepts are blurring our vision of it.
I give here my personal views, presented ini-
tially to the Kaleidoscope 2010 conference, and
share them with the readership of IEEE Com-
munications Magazine for further discussion and
criticism. To trigger the discussion on my per-
spectives regarding the future Internet, I ask for
the liberty to be a little more radical than usual,
as I really think that it is important to be
provocative, at least in some ways.
I have two positions in this article: first, that
the future Internet should be polymorphic; that
is, it will need to conciliate different architec-
tural paradigms. Particularly, the future Internet
(at least in a long transitory period) would have
to support the evolution of the current Internet
in the form of IPv6 or any other evolution of the
current IP architecture along with other more
revolutionary paradigms. Therefore, it is impera-
tive to consider flexibility as the main property
of the future Internet to provide smooth coexis-
tence of evolutionary and revolutionary
paradigms. My second position is that we should
build the future Internet on the strong scientific
foundations of networking science. The assump-
tion of this science is that ancient networks, like
roads, the postal service, and telephony, have
some common principles with the latest develop-
ments of networks, like the Internet and online
social networks. Networking science borrows
some of its principles from well established disci-
plines, such as computer science, physics, social
science, and economics, but it also maintains its
own particular fundamental laws and principles.
The multidisciplinary concept of networking sci-
ence is therefore imperative to better under-
stand and analyze the future Internet.
Admittedly, networking science is under devel-
opment, and ongoing research is still underway
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to define all its dimensions. Yet there is an
explicit  consensus in academia on some basic
concepts. Among the founding concepts of this
new discipline, I wish to expound on the princi-
ple of cooperation as a reading lens for under-
standing the main issues of the future Internet.
COOPERATION: THE VERY ESSENCE
OF NETWORKING
A network can be defined as a set of nodes that
are cooperating with each other to distribute
(exchange) information. A network architecture
is there to provide a framework for nurturing
this cooperation. The open systems interconnec-
tion (OSI) architecture allows only cooperation
between layers in the same level of the architec-
ture, and uses primitives provided by lower lay-
ers. This makes the development of new
cooperation tractable and easy to formalize.
Layer opacity and independence have enabled
programmers to concentrate on a single layer
and implement services without being obliged to
tussle with other layers. However, layering always
charges a performance cost. Indeed, one can
imagine other types of cooperation, and the past
decade has seen the development of such alter-
natives. For example, cross-layering (i.e.,
enabling a layer to access information and to
interact with any other layers) for higher effi-
ciency, performance, resource management, and
security. In particular, we have witnessed the
emergence of the autonomic network idea,
whereby a network component is seen as an
active element that is self-conscious and interacts
with its environment. The development of the
autonomic network concept has led to a major
shift of the networking paradigm from a layered
to a puzzle view, where autonomic components
cooperate with each other.
The classical view tends to consider the role
of a network element in processing packets only.
By considering that the network element can
decide which type of cooperation it will imple-
ment, networking science broadens its scope
considerably. The decision is based not only on
network objectives defined by the network oper-
ator or the service provider, but also on selfish
goals of the person or entity that owns the node.1
Selfishness might drive a node to go into standby
mode to reduce battery consumption or drop
packets that are not of interest. The observation
that nodes might be selfish is a major change. It
is motivated by several application scenarios, like
ad hoc wireless networks, inter-AS routing, and
peer-to-peer networks. Selfishness means a node
cannot assume that its neighbors will fully coop-
erate, and it needs to react accordingly. There-
fore, the node might have to implement a palette
of different profiles for different contexts and
appear polymorphic. Integrating selfishness is
then a central motivation for proposing that the
future Internet architecture be polymorphic.
As economics purports to address the pro-
duction, distribution, and consumption of ser-
vices and goods, networking science addresses
the production, distribution, and consumption of
“information.” Understanding, formalizing, and
shaping cooperation for the distribution of infor-
mation are the major goals of network science.
However, economics is a science that applies to
resources that are scarce and have alternative
uses. What differentiates digital information
from other goods is that information is universal
and infinitely reusable; that is, once produced,
information supply becomes infinite, and there is
almost no cost in reproducing it. Moreover,
information is ambiguous (discriminating wrong
from correct information is hard), whereas other
goods and services are unambiguous. Therefore,
a new cooperation theory, different from classi-
cal economical theory, must be developed to
integrate network cooperation and the economi-
cal value of information.
TO CLEAN THE SLATE OR NOT? 
IS IT REALLY AN ISSUE?
The Internet was always designed, developed,
and deployed simultaneously. More precisely,
whenever a problem arose, a solution was pro-
posed and analyzed, following a technical con-
sensus at the Internet Engineering Task Force
(IETF), resulting in a Request for Comments
(RFC) that solved the issue or implemented a
new feature. The IETF consensus guaranteed
that the proposed evolution of the Internet was
backward-compatible and complied with the
sacrosanct axiom of “no harm to what works.”
This process is one of the main explanations for
the huge success and relative stability of the cur-
rent Internet.
The clean-slate approach comes from the
belief that it is impossible to resolve the chal-
lenges facing todays Internet without rethinking
the fundamental assumptions and design deci-
sions underlying its current architecture. The
incremental approach changes the Internet
architecture by backwardcompatible patches; the
clean-slate approach advocates out-of-the-box
thinking with an architectural redesign, based on
ameliorated concepts and abstractions to answer
the current challenges.
Deciding between a clean slate and an evolu-
tionary approach has become a major subject of
controversy in the Internet community. Clean
slate critics advocate that it is not wise to
destruct something that works. Clean slate
adepts state that the current Internet architec-
ture constrains future evolution and hinders the
deployment of radical solutions that attack exist-
ing problems (to be described later).
Indeed, the future Internet (at least in a long
transitory period) should have to support the
evolution of the current Internet. However, the
future architecture should not hinder the design
and deployment of other more revolutionary
paradigms. This means that the key property of
the future Internet architecture is having enough
flexibility to enable the coexistence of the evolu-
tion of the current Internet (via incremental
patches) with clean-slate revolutionary approach-
es. We should design the future Internet so that
the question of cleaning the slate becomes irrel-
evant. I describe later why I believe that such
flexibility is achievable with current virtualization
technologies.


















1 The owner of a comput-
er in a peer-to-peer net-
work or the owner of an
autonomous system (AS)
border gateway router.
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a tough task. We need to choose, among the
large set of possible architectures, that could
replace the current Internet. Going for a clean-
slate approach means that it will not be possible
to deploy it easily on the current Internet. This
means that testing, validating, and debugging
clean-slate approaches need large-scale experi-
mental facilities. This explains why almost all ini-
tiatives on the future Internet, like [1, 3], are
backed by large-scale platforms. However, the
networking research community has not yet
agreed on how to conduct reproducible large-
scale experiments. Answering this question is
one of the major challenges of network science
and a prerequisite for validating clean-slate
approaches. This issue is another one of the
major motivations of why the future Internet
needs to be polymorphic. As clean-slate
approaches can be difficult to validate, one has
to ensure a fallback of network nodes to classical
IP technologies. Thus, at least for reliability rea-




There is broad consensus that the current Inter-
net has some shortcomings that make its evolu-
tion and/or revolution inevitable. I give some of
the main rationale along three directions here:
flexibility, security, and scalability. This critical
analysis sheds some light on the directions to go
to design the future Internet.
FLEXIBILITY OR THE
FUTURE INTERNET CONTORTIONIST
I have already presented some arguments as to
why the future Internet has to be flexible enough
to accommodate different cooperation models
simultaneously. Another rationale relates to new
application deployment. The current Internet
does not provide architectural hooks to deploy
services beyond the socket interface; developers
have no access to routing and addressing. For
this reason, during the past decade, developers
have frequently raised routing and addressing
into the application level, where they can access
it. Peer-to-peer and overlay networks are exam-
ples of this approach, and implement a complete
cooperation scheme in the application level
(more precisely, above the socket interface).
While this approach has been very successful, it
is not optimal, as the packets still have to go
through the underlying narrow hourglass of IP
that acts as a bottleneck. A network where one
could implement and deploy new network proto-
cols or cooperation schemes without disturbing
other running protocols would solve the applica-
tion deployment issue and moreover provide an
efficient way for innovative service deployment.
The network research community has pursued
the quest for a flexible experimentation platform
for future Internet research. This has resulted in
the development of Planetlab [3]; its European
counterpart, OneLab [4]; and GENI [1]. The flexi-
bility in these experimental platforms was
attained0, thanks to the wide generalization of vir-
tualization approaches [5]. Virtualization ensures
full isolation (fault, software, and performance iso-
lation) between virtual machines. Because it
enables the parallel execution of different net-
working systems (routing, addressing, etc.), it
opens the way for a polymorphic future Internet.
Virtualization techniques encapsulate a full vir-
tual machine into a single file that can be easily
migrated and executed over any virtualized hard-
ware. The encapsulation property opens the per-
spective of easy deployment of services just by
distributing the encapsulated virtual machine.
Thus, it is possible to implement the service over a
large infrastructure of virtualized servers/
routers. Last but not least, virtualization ensures
interposition, because all activities go through a
monitoring layer. Nowadays, commodity hardwares
have enough processing power to build virtual
routers over clusters of multicore routers [6]. This
opens the perspective of building realistic routers,
implementing the polymorphic future Internet.
SECURITY: THE ACHILLES’S HEEL OF THE
CURRENT INTERNET
One of the major rationales for the development
of a future Internet is security. Indeed, the cur-
rent Internet is plagued with spam, phishing,
denial of service attacks, exploiting security
breaches, and so on. However, only a small pro-
portion of security-related problems could be
traced back to the Internet architecture. Network
security can be defined along three directions:
communication security (ensuring that communi-
cation remains secret), cooperation security
(ensuring that cooperation in networks is possi-
ble and secure), and, finally, application security
(ensuring that an application is doing what it is
supposed to do). Future Internet architecture
should support each of the above components.
Security was not considered to be an essential
component of the current Internet architecture.
While support for communication security
through IPSec exists (as an optional element in
IPv4 and a mandatory one in IPv6), no support
for the two other aspects of security exists. This
has resulted in the current security status, where
several external services, like virtual private net-
works (VPNs), firewalls, proxies, and Secure
Sockets Layer (SSL), compensate for the lack of
support built into the architecture.
The current status of Internet security has
motivated extreme positions. On one hand, some
suggest the integration of all security primitives
inside the architecture, so that applications can
fully rely on architectural security services. How-
ever, this could degrade the performance of net-
work elements significantly. An opposite
viewpoint advocates a “keep it simple, stupid”
(KISS) approach, where the architecture should
remain simple by focusing only on packet for-
warding, and security mechanisms should remain
on the network edges, like firewalls and IPSec
mechanisms. This viewpoint is also problematic,
as one cannot control the network completely
without acting on the core of the architecture. In
between these two extremes, the future Internet
will have to determine the least common denom-
inator of security support; in other terms, what
should be mandatorily integrated into the archi-
There is a consensus
in the research com-
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tecture and what could be considered as an
applicative service that will cooperate with other
components through the architecture.
The experience of IPSec shows that commu-
nication security can be supported satisfactorily
through solutions that do not need to go deep
into the core of the architecture. By looking at
security through the cooperation lens, the future
Internet architecture needs to integrate mecha-
nisms to secure cooperation. This means that at
least three basic security mechanisms have to be
integrated to the future Internet architecture: an
isolation mechanism shielding components run-
ning in the same execution environment strictly
and at the deepest level, an authentication
mechanism authenticating the source of a run-
ning code, and a monitoring mechanism that will
evaluate the cooperation behavior of executing
components and compare it with normal or
expected behaviors. None of these mechanisms
exists in the current Internet. However, virtual-
ization provides mechanisms to guarantee fault,
performance, and execution isolation. It also
guarantees interposition. This means that a vir-
tualized and polymorphic architecture for the
future Internet will provide two out of the three
needed basic security mechanisms. The scope of
the authentication service is still a research
topic, as it is not yet clear if a global authentica-
tion and/or identity mechanism is mandatory, or
if only a local and trust-based scheme will be
enough to cover the large spectrum of scenarios.
Permanent monitoring is a trade-off between
performance and security; the more security we
need, the more exhaustive the monitoring should
be. We also have a trade-off between flexibility
(in terms of the range of acceptable behaviors)
and security; detecting abnormal behaviors entails
reducing the range of acceptable behaviors to be
able to differentiate them from abnormal ones.
It is worth recalling that security is a negative
concept: you do not appreciate it when you have
it; you only realize its significant importance when
you have lost it. This means that rather than
speaking about providing security, one should talk
about reducing vulnerabilities. Almost 30 years of
experience in Internet security has taught us that
it is too costly and even impossible to remove all
risks. The consequence of this is that we have to
increase the resilience of the future Internet
architecture to ensure survivability and to reduce
the impact of security risks. In other terms, secu-
rity risks should be assumed as a plausible opera-
tional hypothesis in the design of networked
systems, and architectural solutions should be
provided to detect and to contain them. This is a
radically different position from the current
approaches, where the emphasis is put on authen-
tication of users through passwords/biometrics
and assuming that authenticated users are enti-
tled to do whatever they do. In the collaborative
approach, we have to assume that users (even
authenticated) can misbehave, and we should be
able to detect and contain them. This is another
shift in the security paradigm.
A noteworthy action that is supporting the
paradigm change mentioned above is the ITU-
Cybex action, aiming to develop a standard
cybersecurity information exchange framework
[7]. ITU-Cybex is based on the observation that
security risks are now internationally endemic.
In this context, information about security events
should be shared rather than being considered
as private issues.
SCALABILITY, OR A DELUSION OF GRANDEUR
Scalability is another cardinal issue for the future
Internet. The past decade has seen almost a
doubling of Internet traffic per year. The size of
routing tables, which are the main indicator of
the complexity of the routing operation, has seen
yearly growth of 19.4 percent from 2002 to 2008.2
Before dealing with scalability, we have to
answer the question of why we need an address
and how to answer this need. Initially, IP
addresses were designed to identify resources on
the network and locate them. However, this mix-
ing of roles leads to some contradictions. On
one hand, using an IP address as an identifier
means that a unique IP address should be
assigned to each resource in the network. On the
other hand, using the IP address as a locator
means that the address should change when the
location of the resource changes. The locator
address should satisfy some topological con-
straints (the locator address of nearby resources
should be close), whereas identifiers should
meet some semantic constraints (the addresses
of all resources of the same operator should be
close). The contradiction between the require-
ment of these two roles has resulted in the frag-
mentation of the IP address space and the
scalability problem. While IPv6 solved the issue
of identification address space exhaustion, it
does not resolve the address space fragmenta-
tion that is the source of the scalability problem.
During the past two decades, several proposi-
tions have reduced address space fragmentation.
In 1989, BGP introduced AS-level IP address
aggregation; in 1993 classless Internet domain
routing (CIDR) was used to regain the address
waste resulting from past class-based allocations.
However, address allocations had to remain
compatible with previously allocated addresses
because of the identification role of IP address-
es. The Routing Research Group (RRG) of the
Internet Research Task Force (IRTF) is current-
ly investigating ways to improve the scalability of
the current Internet in the current IP architec-
tural framework. I do not give an exhaustive
view of the proposed schemes. However, the
main rationale of almost all of these proposals
[8, 9] is to decouple the identifier and locator
roles of the address. For example, Locator/Iden-
tifier Separation Protocol (LISP) [8] proposes a
mapping system between the identifier and loca-
tor through an Alternative Topology (ALT) ser-
vice. This mapping enables one to find the
location of a given identifier, similar to what a
Domain Name Service (DNS) server does. Iden-
tifier-Locator Network Protocol (ILNP) [9] has a
similar mapping, but is done through DNSSEC
rather than a specific service.
A “clean slate” approach to scalability does
not enforce compatibility with the current IP
architecture. New network scenarios, like delay-
tolerant networks, showed that routing might not
be possible in some scenarios. It was even shown
that in order to optimize the throughput, net-
work coding, which is not based on routing,
Scalability is another
cardinal issue to con-
sider for the future
Internet. The past
decade has seen
almost a doubling of
Internet traffic per
year. The size of
routing tables, which
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tor of the complexity
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2002 to 2008.
2 See BGP table size evo-
lution at http://bgp.pota-
roo.net/cidr/.
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should be used. Fundamentally, addressing is a
topological embedding adapted to a particular
cooperation need; that is, it is a function that
accepts an identifier and returns the position of
the needed information to a topological space. It
was shown that when the embedding is compact
(i.e., when two nearby items are mapped by the
addressing embedding into close addresses),
addressing implies routing and vice versa. In
other words, if one knows the identifier of what
s/he wants, s/he can derive it from the path direct-
ly to reach it. This property means that scalable
routing is possible and even trivial when compact
embedding exists. IP (v4 or v6) addressing is not
compact, as close nodes are not necessarily close
in the IP address space. Nonetheless, compact
embedding does exist. For example, the Content
Addressable Network [10] (with the assumption
of no node withdrawal) defines compact embed-
ding. The question of knowing whether we can
embed the particular addressing need of a specif-
ic cooperation scheme into compact embedding
is one of the major questions of networking sci-
ence. Peer-to-peer (P2P) and overlay networks
have demonstrated that by lifting the IP address-
ing backward compatibility constraints, scalability
can be achieved, and address fragmentation
avoided. This advocates a clean-slate approach
for the future Internet to enable deployment of
new addressing/ routing schemes. Indeed, one
can note that IP addresses are still needed, even
on P2P and overlay networks. However, this is
more a kind of link layer connectivity issue than
a fundamental need of IP addressing.
A polymorphic future Internet should provide
for the coexistence of traditional IP addresses
with a more revolutionary addressing scheme
and enable gradual introduction of new routing
schemes. IPv6 showed the difficulty of introduc-
ing radical changes into the network. Nearly a
decade after most of the IPv6 standard was com-
pleted, the vast majority of software and hard-
ware still uses IPv4.
CONCLUSION
In this article, I define two main positions: the
future Internet should be polymorphic, and it
should be built on a strong networking science
foundation.
I call for the development of a networking sci-
ence that will provide the foundations for the
future Internet. Networking science will be built
mainly around the concept of cooperation. This
cooperation theory is different from classical eco-
nomics because it integrates network cooperation
and the economic value of information. Another
potentially high-impact area of networking sci-
ence pertains to experimental validation. The net-
working research community still lacks largely
agreed-on methodologies describing how to do
reproducible large-scale experiments and how to
validate large-scale mechanisms before deploying
them in the wild. Answering these two needs is of
the utmost importance for the future Internet.
I also recommended a polymorphic architec-
ture for the future Internet. The rationale behind
this proposal is that a polymorphic view reduces
the importance of the “clean slate vs. evolution-
ary” controversy greatly. In particular, a polymor-
phic architecture will make the gradual deploy-
ment of noncompatible clean slate solutions possi-
ble along with IP-based evolutionary
developments. Virtualization techniques can pro-
vide the flexible technology needed to build such a
polymorphic future Internet. Moreover, these
techniques will ensure isolation and interposition,
two properties that are needed in a future archi-
tecture. The security paradigm would have to shift
from schemes based only on encryption/authenti-
cation to monitoring schemes that permanently
observe the cooperation behavior of network ele-
ments. The last topic developed in the article is
scalability. My position is to promote infinitely
scalable addressing and routing schemes by using
suitable embeddings. This is an argument in favor
of a clean-slate approach. Thus, the future Inter-
net will support different addressing schemes suit-
able for different applications.
In summary, we should aim at designing a
polymorphic Internet architecture that will let us
benefit from innovations without harming the
existing and successful current Internet.
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